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Note: Standards of Mental Illness in the Insanity Defense
and Police Power Commitments: A Proposal for
a Uniform Standard
Civil proceedings to commit dangerous, mentally ill persons
under the police power' and criminal prosecutions in which the
insanity defense is raised both require courts to determine the
existence and severity of mental illness in an individual whose
past behavior suggests future danger to society.2 Civil commit-
1. Police powe-'dommitments for mental illness and dangerousness
must be distinguished from parens patriae commitments, in which state
intervention is justified not by the protection of society but by the non-
dangerous mentally ill individual's need for treatment.
In a recent case, O'Connor v. Donaldson, 422 U.S. 563 (1975), the
Court held that the state must provide treatment for those individuals
committed on the basis of their need for treatment, but did not reach
the question whether this requirement extends to police power commit-
ments. Thus, while treatment to improve the condition of the person
committed is often advanced as a justification for police power com-
mitments, in the absence of universally available and effective treat-
ment, the dominant rationale for those commitments must be the safety
of society. See Livermore, Malmquist & Meehl, On the Justifications for
Civil Commitment, 117 U. PA. L. REv. 75 (1968) [hereinafter cited as
Justifications]; Note, Civil Commitment of the Mentally Ill: Theories
and Procedures, 79 HARv. L. REV. 1288 (1968) [hereinafter cited as
Theories]; Note, Developments in the Law-Civil Commitment of the
Mentally Ill, 87 HARV. L. REv. 1190 (1974) [hereinafter cited as Develop-
ments].
Some state statutes treat commitments of those dangerous only to
themselves as falling within the police power. See Developments, supra
at 1123-24. This Note deals only with commitment of those dangerous
to others.
Since this Note is not concerned with parens patriae commitments,
the phrase civil commitment proceeding will hereinafter be employed to
refer only to police power commitments.
2. At least in theory, the determination that an individual sub-
jected to civil commitment proceedings is dangerous is separate from
the determination of mental illness. This is so because our legal system
has not approved incarceration, whether punitive or preventive, of per-
sons who are known to be dangerous but are neither mentally ill nor
guilty of criminal behavior.
In practice, however, the two determinations may not be distinct.
The statutes generally fail to specify the evidentiary showings to be
made in a commitment proceeding, see S. BRACKEL & R. ROCK, THE
MENTALLY DISABLED AND THE LAW 66-72 (1971), and the typical proceed-
ing is an all too brief affair in which the individual, without effective
legal representation, will be committed or not according to the testimony
of a psychiatrist. Whether or not the psychiatric testimony generally
distinguishes between the issues of mental illness and dangerousness
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ment of one who is dangerous and mentally ill imposes a depri-
vation of personal liberty, usually indefinite internment in a
state mental hospital.3 The insanity defense, on the other hand,
would be a worthy topic for investigation but is beyond the scope of
this Note.
The literature on police power commitments has concentrated on
the problem of determining dangerousness, tending to ignore the prob-
lem of defining mental illness, which is the subject of this Note. See
generally Bazelon, Institutionalization, Deinstitutionalization and the Ad-
versary Process, 75 COLUM. L. REv. 897 (1975); Dershowitz, The Origins
of Preventive Confinement in the Anglo-American Law-Part I: The
English Experience, 43 U. CIN. L. REV. 1 (1974); Dershowitz, The
Origins of Preventive Confinement in the Anglo-American Law-Part
11: The American Experience, 43 U. Cun. L. REv. 781 (1974); Dershowitz,
Preventive Confinement: A Suggested Framework for Constitutional
Analysis, 51 TEX. L. REV. 1277 (1973); Frankel, Preventive Restraints
and Just Compensation: Toward a Sanction Law of the Future, 78 YALE
L.J. 229 (1968); Postel, Civil Commitment: A Functional Analysis, 39
BROOKLYN L. REv. 1 (1968).
A major target of criticism in these writings has been the sole use of
psychiatric predictions as a basis for determining dangerousness. See
Bazelon, Institutionalization, Deinstitutionalization and the Adversary
Process, 75 COLUM. L. REV. 897 (1975); Diamond, The Psychiatric
Prediction of Dangerousness, 123 U. PENN. L. REv. 439 (1975); Ennis
& Litwack, Psychiatry and the Presumption of Expertise: Flipping Coins
in the Courtroom, 62 CALIF. L. REv. 672 (1974); Goldstein & Katz, Dan-
gerousness and Mental Illness: Some Observations on the Decision to
Release Persons Acquitted by Reason of Insanity, 70 YALE L.J. 225
(1960). Recently a federal district court acknowledged this criticism by
holding statutory definitions of dangerousness unconstitutionally vague,
and narrowing them to require that a finding of dangerousness be prem-
ised on a proven past act inflicting or threatening substantial harm to
another. Bell v. Wayne County Gen. Hosp., 384 F. Supp. 1085 (E.D.
Mich. 1971). See Lynch v. Baxley, 386 F. Supp. 378 (M.D. Ala. 1974).
In discussing the determination of mental illness this Note will
refer to the determination of dangerousness as though it is, as it ought
to be, separate from and precedent to the determination of mental ill-
ness and based solely on past conduct.
3. See S. BRACKEL & R. RocK, supra note 2, at 66-72, for a collec-
tion of applicable state statutes authorizing indefinite commitment to
state mental hospitals.
Most individuals civilly committed are discharged within 90 days.
However, this group includes the non-dangerous mentally ill; the aver-
age confinement of the mentally ill and dangerous may be substantially
longer. See Developments, supra note 1. There are no separate figures
for confinement of the latter group. The least restrictive alternative
analysis applied in Lake v. Cameron, 364 F.2d 657 (D.C. Cir.) (en banc),
cert. denied, 382 U.S. 863 (1966), on remand 267 F. Supp. 155 (D.D.C.
1967), suggests that the state's interest must be accomplished through
an alternative procedure which least infringes on the liberty of the in-
dividual. Under this analysis some committed individuals may receive
forms of treatment which do not require that they be confined in an
institution. Although the frequency of these dispositions is uncertain,
it may still be assumed that most patients are institutionalized.
Civil commitment for mental illness and dangerousness has generally
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exonerates an individual from criminal liability after the state
has proved beyond a reasonable doubt that he committed the act
charged;4 but such an acquittal often leads not to freedom, but
to confinement in a state mental hospital.5
The consequences of either proceeding for the individual
concerned are thus similar and perhaps equally grave. Yet de-
spite the similarity in effect between police power commitment
proceedings and the insanity defense, courts use very different
definitions of "mental illness" in the two situations. Definitions
of insanity are fairly strict and reasonably precise, but the stat-
utory formulations of mental illness for civil commitment pur-
poses are vague and susceptible to arbitrary application.6 This
Note will examine certain similarities between the insanity de-
fense and police power commitment and suggest that the defini-
tions employed to test the former should serve as the basis for
narrowing the statutory definitions of mental illness as used in
the latter proceedings to their appropriate scope.
I. CURRENT STANDARDS OF MENTAL ILLNESS
IN THE INSANITY DEFENSE AND
POLICE POWER COMMITMENTS
There are essentially two formulations of the insanity de-
been characterized as non-punitive preventive detention, since incar-
ceration is ordered not to punish for past acts, but to prevent the com-
mission of future acts. Nevertheless, there is a growing awareness that
incarceration in a mental hospital is a severe curtailment of liberty.
Humphrey v. Cady, 405 U.S. 504, 509 (1972); Cross v. Harris, 418 F.2d
1095, 1101-02 (D.C. Cir. 1969). Further, the distinction between treat-
ment and punishment, especially when methods such as electroshock
therapy and certain kinds of chemotherapy are used, is often a very fine
one. See Knecht v. Gillman, 488 F.2d 1136 (8th Cir. 1973).
4. The insanity defense is normally not raised unless the defend-
ant has little hope of being acquitted on other grounds. As a defense,
the issue is usually not raised until after the prosecution has proved
every element of the crime charged. A. GoLDsTEm, THE INSANITY DE-
PENsE 110-11 (1967).
5. Id. at 24.
6. The current disparity between the strictness of the standards of
mental illness in civil commitment and the insanity defense engenders
seemingly inconsistent treatment of the same individual. For example,
if an individual were committed for mental illness and dangerousness
and during his confinement in a state institution committed a crime, he
might fail to meet the strict standard for the insanity defense and there-
fore be sentenced to penal incarceration. Yet at the end of his prison
term, he might remain mentally ill by civil commitment standards and
thus be returned, without de novo commitment proceedings, to the state
hospital for continued indefinite detention. Cf. Lausche v. Commissioner,
225 N.W.2d 366 (Minn. 1974).
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fense currently in use. The M'Naghten Rule, formulated in 1843
and followed by a majority of the states, acquits the accused
whose "disease of the mind" at the time of the act rendered him
ignorant of "the nature and quality of the act" or of the fact
that he was doing wrong.7 The test promulgated in the Amer-
ican Law Institute's (ALI) Model Penal Code, which has been
adopted by most other state courts and all of the federal circuit
courts, retains language exculpating one whose disease prevents
him from knowing the wrongfulness of his conduct, but also
treats as a separate, sufficient ground for acquittal what is only
an implicit element of the M'Naghten test-incapacity to "con-
form his conduct to the requirements of the law."8 While com-
mentators are not fully satisfied with the present formulations,9
whatever shortcomings the tests suffer are not due to want of
attention. Perhaps no topic has proved more alluring to courts
and commentators than the insanity defense. 10  Indeed, in light
7. M'Naghten's Case, 4 St.Tr.N.S. 847, 8 Eng. Rep. 718 (1843).
8. MODEL PENAL CODE § 4.01(1) (1962):
A person is not responsible for criminal conduct if at the time
of such conduct as a result of mental disease or defect he lacks
substantial capacity either to appreciate the criminality [wrong-
fulness] of his conduct or to conform his conduct to the require-
ments of law.
For a discussion of the ALI rule see GOLDSTEIN, supra note 4, at 86-96.
M'Naghten is used in two-thirds of the state jurisdictions. In
about eighteen states an irresistable impulse test, emphasizing inability
to exercise self-control, is used in addition to M'Naghten. GOLD-
sTEm, supra note 4, at 9. In practice, the emphasis on inability to con-
trol behavior may be imported into M'Naghten without formally adopt-
ing the irresistible impulse test. See, e.g., State v. Rawland, 294 Minn. 17,
199 N.W.2d 774 (1972). Most other state jurisdictions and all the federal
circuits have adopted the ALI rule. See GOLDSTEIN, supra note 4, at 45
and United States v. Brawner, 471 F.2d 969 (D.C. Cir. 1972). Thus, a
majority of the states provide for acquittal of the accused who was un-
able to control himself due to mental illness, either by adding an ir-
resistable impulse provision to the M'Naghten test or by applying the
ALI rule.
9. For example, there is support for the suggestion that the cur-
rent formulations of the insanity defense be abandoned and that psy-
chiatric testimony focus on whether the accused had the required mens
rea, an essential element of the crime charged. Goldstein & Katz,
Abolish the Insanity Defense-Why Not?, 72 YALE L.J. 853 (1963);
Goldstein, The Brawner Rule-Why?, or No More Nonsense or Non
Sense in the Criminal Law, Please!, 1973 WASH. U.L.Q. 126.
10. See generally R. ARENS, THE INSANITY DEFENSE (1974); A.
MATTHWS, MENTAL ILLNESS AND THE CRIMINAL LAW (1967); Livermore
& Meehl, The Virtues of M'Naghten, 51 MINN. L. REv. 789 (1967);
Morris, Psychiatry and the Dangerous Criminal, 41 S. CAL. L. REv. 514
(1968); and the cases cited and discussed in GOLDSTEIN, supra note 4, at
45-96.
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of the relatively few cases in which the defense is raised,"- the
attention given it may be presumed to reflect the profound
moral issues it presents within the highly visible criminal proc-
ess, rather than its widespread social importance.
12
In contrast, while every state jurisdiction has authorized
police power commitments by statute, these statutory formula-
tions of mental illness are multifarious. A precise character-
ization of the standards is hampered not only by their diversity
but by the vagueness of the language used.' 3 For example,
Kentucky's statute, which is similar to a number of others,
authorizes commitment of those suffering from "a psychiatric
or other disease which substantially impairs. . . mental health"'
4
without further defining any of the terms used.
Unfortunately, the vague language of these statutes has
been little clarified by decisional law; the courts, to a large
degree, have not undertaken their traditional role of providing
a definitive version of an otherwise vague statute. Despite the
fact that such statutory formulations result in the involuntary
confinement of perhaps 50,000 persons per year,' 5 there is no
evidence of extensive efforts by legislators, courts or commenta-
tors to define or refine the police power standard, similar to the
efforts lavished on the insanity defense.'6
11. See GOLDSTEIN, supra note 4, at 23-25. Although most of the
commentators agree that the insanity defense is relatively rare, precise
statistics are unavailable.
12. Id. at 3-4.
13. See statutes quoted in S. BRAcKEL & R. RocK, supra note 2, at
66-72.
14. Ky. REv. STAT. § 202.010 (1) (1970).
At least one court has held a state commitment statute unconstitu-
tionally vague and overbroad. In Bell v. Wayne County Gen. Hosp., 384
F. Supp. 1085, 1095 (E.D. Mich. 1975), the court struck down a Michigan
statute which defined mental illness to
include every species of insanity and extend to every mentally
deranged person, and to all of unsound mind, other than the
mentally handicapped, epileptic, and persons who manifest the
general deterioration of mental processes, including disorienta-
tion confusion or impairment of memory, associated with senil-
ity, but without psychotic implications.
The court commented: "By the terms of that definition virtually any
mental disorder would qualify, including many which, although unfortu-
nate, could not be classified as other than harmless." Id.
15. Diamond, supra note 2, at 440.
16. "Little has been done, legislatively or judicially, in a com-
prehensive fashion to examine the parameters, inter-relationships and
constitutional bases of the various laws dealing with mental illness."
12931976]
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The vagueness of police power commitment statutes allows
inequitable and unpredictable results in commitment proceed-
ings. In police power commitments, the state, acting under its
plenary police power to provide for the safety, welfare, and
health of its citizens, is an adversary of the individual." The
object of the state's solicitude is not primarily the proposed
patient, but rather the safety of society, which the individual
supposedly threatens.' 8 When the standard the state must meet
is vague and uncertain, the result of any of these proceedings is
unpredictable, and the standard may in fact be determined by
each court on the particular facts of each case.' 9 Two forms of
inconsistency might result: dissimilar standards used in differ-
ent courts in the same jurisdiction, 20 and even different stand-
ards used by the same court in different cases. Thus, the conse-
quence of liberty or confinement might depend on one's fortune
or misfortune in appearing before a particular judge. Moreover,
if the standard is uncertain, the trier of fact, either judge or
jury, has the freedom to lower the standard and assure the state
success if factors irrelevant to a determination of mental illness,
such as a hostile demeanor or past criminal record, prompt the
trier of fact to desire confinement for the proposed patient.
Alternatively, the lack of a well-defined standard would allow
the trier of fact who felt sympathetic to the proposed patient
to raise the standard and ensure that the individual remained
at liberty.
A related ramification of the vague standards used for
In re Ballay, 482 F.2d 648, 654 n.29 (D.C. Cir. 1973) (holding that the
burden of proof at involuntary civil commitment proceedings must be
proof beyond a reasonable doubt).
17. See Justifications, supra note 1; Theories, supra note 1.
18. See note 1 supra.
19. At least at the trial level where the judge issues no opinion in
support of his decision, he may fashion the standard not only incon-
sistently but sub silentio. At least one author believes that police power
commitments may be used to incarcerate in a mental hospital an in-
dividual whom the state suspects has committed a crime but against
whom it cannot muster evidence sufficient for a criminal conviction.
Dershowitz, Preventive Confinement: A Suggested Framework for Con-
stitutional Analysis, 51 Tax. L. Ray. 1277 (1973).
20. In part because few commitments are appealed, the appellate
courts have failed to develop a uniform standard within a jurisdiction.
Undoubtedly, this result is at least partially caused by inadequate legal
representation for proposed patients. They usually receive either no le-
gal representation, or the most cursory and ineffective legal counsel.
See Chalmers & Davis, Legal Representation in Civil Commitment, 45
Miss. L.J. 43 (1974).
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commitments for mental illness and dangerousness is the im-
portance placed on psychiatric testimony. When legislators and
courts fail to provide a well-defined, uniformly applicable legal
standard, a psychiatric definition is substituted for the absent
legal standard.21 This medical assessment of mental illness
focuses on diagnosis, recommended treatment, probable course
of the illness, and expectations for recovery. The psychiatric
concepts of mental illness comprehend a vast array of aberra-
tions, from total dysfunction and divorce from reality to annoy-
ing or disturbing eccentricities. 22 A regard for individual lib-
erty, basic to our legal system, would prevent acceptance of
a system through which all persons with compulsive habits or
grandiose self concepts would be deprived of their liberty.2
Yet such persons may be mentally ill by medical standards.
On the other hand, a legal standard would more properly
focus on balancing the state's interest in protecting its citizens
against the interest of the proposed patient in maintaining his
liberty. With a legal guideline, the court's inquiry would less
likely be limited to such factors as medical diagnosis or the ad-
visability of treatment, limitations which are inappropriate in a
proceeding where the safety of society is the state's primary in-
terest. A psychiatric diagnosis of "mental illness" should not be
determinative in the court's balancing of interests.
Furthermore, when no legal standard is used to sift out ir-
relevant data and judge the import of a psychiatrist's testimony,
this testimony may become conclusive, depriving the legally
ordained decision-maker, the judge or jury, of the final decision
on who shall go free and who shall be incarcerated. 24 In a re-
21. Justifications, supra note 1, at 86, 88-89.
22. See J. KATZ, J. GOLDSTEIN & A. DERsHowITZ, PSYCHOANALYSIS,
PSYCHIATRY AND THE LAW, 506-26 (1967); J. PAGE, PSYCHOPATHOLOGY,
THE SCIENCE OF UNDERSTANDING DEVIANCE (2d ed. 1971), for a collection
of representative categories of mental illness used by psychiatrists for
diagnostic purposes.
23. Cf. Bell v. Wayne County Gen. Hosp., 384 F. Supp. 1085 (E.D.
Mch. 1975) (quoted in note 14 supra).
24. See Bazelon, supra note 2, at 911. Strikingly similar problems
with psychiatric testimony in the insanity defense were chronicled
in the District of Columbia Circuit during the time the Durham Rule
was employed. Durham called for a determination of whether the de-
fendant's act was the "product" of mental disease. This formulation
encouraged usurpation of jury function by psychiatrists so severely that
the court finally abandoned the test in United States v. Brawner, 471
F.2d 969 (1972), and adopted the ALI rule. Prior to Brawner the court
had unsuccessfully sought to limit the role of psychiatric testimony.
United States v. Eichberg, 439 F.2d 620 (1971); Washington v. United
19761 1295
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lated context, the Supreme Court has recognized that this final
decision must reside in the judge or jury. In Humphrey v.
Cady,2 5 the Court said:
Wisconsin conditions such confinement not solely on the medical
judgment that the defendant is mentally ill and treatable, but
also on the social and legal judgment that his potential for doing
harm, to himself or others, is great enough to justify such a
massive deprivation of liberty. In making this determination,
the jury serves the critical function of introducing into the
process a lay judgment reflecting values generally held in the
community, concerning the kinds of potential harm that justify
the State in confining a person for compulsory treatment. 26
II. THE INSANITY DEFENSE AND POLICE POWER
COMMITMENT COMPARED
A. DIFFERENT CONSEQUENCES FOR THE MENTALLY TLL
When a jury decides to exonerate a defendant from crim-
inal sanction: because he did not know "the nature and quality
of the act ... [or that] he was doing what was wrong" or "that
he lacks substantial capacity to appreciate the wrongfulness of
his conduct or to conform his conduct to the requirements of the
law,"'27 it necessarily determines that the defendant lacked con-
trol over his behavior.28 This incapacity to control behavior by
reason of mental illness exonerates the defendant from moral
blameworthiness and punishment.20 Society distinguishes the
mentally ill defendant from those held criminally responsible
States, 390 F.2d 444 (1967); McDonald v. United States, 312 F.2d 847
(1962); Carter v. United States, 252 F.2d 608 (1957). The fallibilities of
psychiatric testimony included use of confusing and uninformative
terminology and injection of personal bias into testimony. The same
fallibilities apply in civil commitment proceedings. See Ennis & Lit-
wack, supra note 2.
25. 405 U.S. 504 (1972).
26. Id. at 509. The statute in question authorized commitment
of "sexual psychopaths." These statutes are fairly common in statejurisdictions. S. BRAcxEL & R. ROCK, supra note 2, at 341-75. Since
the rationale for these commitments, protection of society and possible
amelioration of the patient's condition, is the same as that for police
power commitments in general, a special analysis of sexual psychopath
commitments is unnecessary for present purposes.
27. See notes 7-8 supra and accompanying text.
28. For a more extensive discussion of the focus of the insanity
defense standards on incapacity for control of behavior, see GOLDSTEIN,
supra note 4, at 12-13.
29. Id. This exoneration is theoretically no different from the
exoneration of an individual who lacked control over his behavior be-
cause of physical illness, as in the case of the automobile driver who
has a heart attack at the wheel that causes his vehicle to collide with
another car.
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because mental illness has impaired the operation of that gen-
erally effective array of social, legal, and moral forces that impel
most individuals to operate within the confines of the law.3 0
One of the apparent functions of the criminal law is deterrence,
though individuals seldom make a decision to forego commis-
sion of a crime solely because of the possibility of arrest, con-
viction, and punishment. Equally potent disincentives are a
moral sense of right and wrong and the fear of social disap-
proval. Individuals with highly developed ethical sensibilities
and regard for social proprieties are rarely faced with a decision
to commit or abstain from crime. These ethical and social forces
combine to remove a criminal act from the realm of alternative
actions the decision-maker contemplates. While in any given
criminal case, such forces will have failed to restrain the particu-
lar defendant, society holds responsible those not mentally ills1
because, in theory at least, although such individuals chose to dis-
regard society's restraints, they were not incapable of heeding
them.3 2 Their freely chosen criminal conduct makes them morally
blameworthy and justifies imposition of criminal sanctions. The
mentally ill defendant, however, had no comparable freedom to
choose to obey the law and is therefore not blameworthy.
While society is willing to exonerate a defendant who can-
not control his behavior to accord with the criminal law, it is
equally willing to impose indefinite detention upon the mentally
ill and dangerous through civil commitment. The legal disposi-
tion of these individuals is also different from that accorded to
the non-mentally ill but dangerous. Social and environmental
data afford a basis for predicting that certain groups within the
population are fifty to eighty percent likely to commit a crime
30. Id.
31. It is difficult to describe individuals who are likely to commit
crimes as mentally healthy, since the effect of this undesirable char-
acteristic is to bring death, physical suffering, or pecuniary loss to the
victim of the crime, as well as conviction and punishment to the
criminal. The psychopath, a term describing an individual who can-
not learn from experience, acts impulsively, and demands quick grat-
ification for his desires, is described as mentally ill in some diagnostic
systems. The Model Penal Code-American Law Institute test for the
insanity defense includes the proviso: "The terms 'mental disease or
defect' do not include an abnormality manifested only by repeated crim-
inal or otherwise anti-social conduct." MODEL PENAL CODE § 4.01
(1962).
32. While it is often argued that a life spent in a vicious and
amoral environment effectively decreases a person's freedom to choose
to obey the law, our legal system has so far declined to exonerate these
individuals. See Livermore & Meehl, supra note 10, at 846-49, 854-55.
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within a relatively short time.33 Yet, at present, before a crime
is committed, the legal system refrains from incarcerating these
groups on this basis alone. No such reticence is practiced in
detaining the equally or less dangerous mentally ill.34 The
common perception is that the social, moral, and legal restraints
which may be effective in deterring the non-mentally ill and
dangerous will be ineffective in deterring the mentally ill.3 5
Society views their mental illness as making them incapable of
controlling their behavior and thus incapable of heeding these
restraints.3 6  Confronted with two individuals equally likely to
commit an act harmful to others, one of whom is mentally ill
and one of whom is not, we fear the mentally ill individual more
and therefore feel justified in committing him for indefinite con-
finement in a mental hsopital. The equally dangerous non-men-
tally ill individual, however, will remain at liberty unless and
until he commits a crime.
The justification, then, for involuntary commitment of men-
tally ill and dangerous persons must lie in the fact that they
are relatively unable to control their behavior. In a police power
commitment proceeding, the state's interest in preventing future
harmful acts and improving the condition of the proposed patient
is concededly compelling. But to achieve its goal and eschew
unnecessary deprivations of liberty requires that the class of per-
sons to be affeoted be precisely and narrowly defined.37 The
court in every police power commitment must therefore deter-
mine that the proposed patient lacks the capacity to obey the
restraints that dangerous but sane individuals are at least capable
of obeying. The present vague statutory definitions, however,
do not require courts to make such a finding, and inquiry is not
focused upon control or lack thereof. Perhaps this lack of in-
quiry into the effect of mental illness is due to a monolithic con-
cept of mental disease, an ancient fear of all mentally ill people
as totally deprived of control over their behavior. Yet the litera-
ture, both legal and medical, and our common, daily experience
belies this assumption of lack of control. 38 There are many per-
33. Justifications, supra note 1, at 79. Significantly, the data on
which these predictions are made have nothing to do with mental illness,
but rather age, race, socio-economic status, and previous criminal rec-
ords.
34. See generally Livermore & Meehl, supra note 10, at 818;
Justifications, supra note 1, at 86.
35. GOLDSTEIN, supra note 4, at 12-13.
36. See In re Ballay, 482 F.2d 648, 660 (D.C. Cir. 1973).
37. See S. BRAcKET & R. RocK, supra note 2, at 66-72.
38. See generally Justifications, supra note 1, at 88-91.
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sons, impaired to some degree or in some manner by mental ill-
ness, who continue to think and act reasonably in other areas,
and whose behavior is under their control. Livermore, Malm-
quist, and Meehl relate the story of a bus driver who inflicted
his paranoid delusions on his passengers, but when admonished
by his employer to desist or lose his job, did so and continued
to be employed as a driver for many years.39 Even inmates of
mental hospitals quickly learn to curb the desire to air or act
out their delusions. 4 0 Thus, the blanket assumption that mental
illness is always accompanied by a substantial diminution of ca-
pacity to control conduct may often be incorrect. To the extent
that present commitment standards depend upon that incapac-
ity, they do not delineate with sufficient narrowness and preci-
sion the class of persons that may justifiably be reached by the
state in commitment proceedings.
B. THE SHARED CHARACTERISTIC OF INSANITY DEFENDANTS
AND THE MENTALLY ILL Aim DANGEROUS
The relevant inquiry in police power commitments then,
must be guided by a far narrower standard of mental illness
than current medical or statutory standards. Assuming that an
individual can be shown to be dangerous, he must be distinct
from other dangerous persons who remain at liberty by virtue
of his incapacity to control his behavior, just as the insane de-
fendant must be distinct from those persons held responsible for
their crimes because of this same incapacity to control behavior.
Insanity-acquittal defendants and the proper subjects for police
power commitments share this salient characteristic, an incapac-
ity for control, or inability to choose to obey the law. They are,
in fact, the same class of persons; the primary difference being
that the insanity defendant's tendency to harm others has been
proven by an attempt or the commission of a crime, while the
mentally ill and dangerous person's harm is largely inchoate.
If an insane defendant were intercepted before the crime was
committed, given that the likelihood of the crime could be fore-
seen, he would be a proper subject for police power commit-
ment. Similarly, if an individual committed for mental illness
and dangerousness had not been intercepted and his dangerous-
ness had matured into commission of a crime, he could appropri-
ately raise the insanity defense, again because he lacked substan-
39. Id. at 90 n.42.
40. GOLDSTEIN, supra note 4, at 26-28.
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tial capacity to control his behavior by reason of mental
illness.4 1
While proposing a narrower focus for psychiatric testimony
and a more stringent standard for commitment statutes, the
above analysis would not impede the state's legitimate desire to
remove from society those persons whose combined mental ill-
ness and dangerousness pose a substantial threat to others. The
effect of the proposed standard in certain specific circumstances
can be shown through a series of examples, drawn in part from
the case law.
Individual A is a well-educated woman who is successful in
her work but complains of severe anxiety and episodes of psy-
chosis when she imagines that her fellow workers are attempt-
ing to "destroy" her by character assassination. Even if this
were true, there would be no threat of serious bodily harm or
death to A, but A's mental illness, paranoid schizophrenia,
makes her equate character assassination with actual physical
destruction and in turn justifies, in her mind, self-defense in
the form of physical violence-even homicide. The likely target
for self-defense is her superior at work, who has failed to put
a stop to the malicious gossip A has imagined. This supervisor,
therefore, is attempting to annihilate her. A has been overtly
hostile to her superior and is likely to take some violent action
soon. Assuming that this contemplated action is likely enough
to justify a finding of dangerousness, A would be a proper sub-
ject of a police power commitment since her mental illness has
substantially reduced her capacity to conform her conduct to
the law.4 2
41. The insanity defense is usually raised only in trials for capital
crimes, and the situation usually envisioned is a murder trial. GOLD-
STIN, supra note 4, at 24. The harm threatened by an individual com-
mitted under the police power need not be so egregious. Recent cases
challenging state commitment statutes in federal court as unconstitu-
tionally vague have narrowed the definition of dangerousness to require
that a finding of dangerousness be premised on a proven past act inflict-
ing or threatening substantial harm to another. Bell v. Wayne County
Gen. Hosp., 384 F. Supp. 1085, 1095 (E.D. Mich. 1975); Lynch v. Baxley,
386 F. Supp. 378, 388 (M.D. Ala. 1974). This would seem to include at
least all criminal activity. These cases do, however, limit the definition
of dangerousness more narrowly than may be true in other state juris-
dictions where no definitive interpretation of a vague statute has been
rendered.
42. Example A was derived from Livermore & Meehl, supra note 10,
at 836-38. Meehl is a psychologist and this example was used, rather
than another invented, to ensure that the characteristics of mental ill-
ness imputed to the hypothetical individual would reflect actual cases
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Individual B is a young man with a long history of mental
illness, currently living at home with his parents. B believes
that he will be elected president of the United States in the
forthcoming elections but also believes that there is a vast con-
spiracy to assassinate him. He perceives his father to be the
malevolent leader of this conspiracy. When his father deprives
him of his shotgun, B is enraged since the gun represented his
last hope for self-defense. Believing that his father is bringing
to fruition the conspiracy to assassinate him, B makes a seem-
ingly unprovoked attack on his father. He is unable to under-
stand the wrongfulness of his action or refrain from further
attacks. He would be a proper subject for a police power com-
mitment, or, if he were prosecuted for the assault on his father,
for acquittal on the ground of insanity.43
Individual C was found not guilty by reason of insanity for
the crime of murder and committed to a state hospital. His con-
dition seemed to improve and three years later he was trans-
ferred from the maximum security unit and given ground
privileges. A short time later a hospital employee was found
raped and murdered in an isolated section of the hospital grounds,
and a few days later C confessed to the crime. His trial for this
crime did not begin until about a year later; in the meantime C
remained in the hospital. The director of the hospital in another
proceeding initiated at the time of the trial unsuccessfully peti-
tioned a court for C's unconditional release, certifying that he was
neither mentally ill nor dangerous. At the criminal trial, mem-
bers of the hospital staff testified that at the time of the crime C
had been cured of any mental disease or defect. C's insanity de-
fense failed and he was convicted of second degree murder, but
he has remained under commitment at the hospital by order of
the court. This result would not occur under the proposed
standard for commitment. C would either be mentally ill, be
acquitted under the insanity defense, and remain at the hospital,
or would be found not mentally ill and guilty and would receive
of mental illness. The same rationale promoted the choice of examples
B, C and D. The kinds of harm the individuals in the examples threaten
or have caused are more serious than would be necessary to make a
finding of dangerousness in most instances. Furthermore, all these
individuals suffer from what would be described as psychosis by medical
definitions of mental illness, but the current statutory standards, and
broader medical definitions, would include far less severe disorders,
such as neurosis or personality disorder.
43. This example is derived from the facts of State v. Rawland,
294 Minn. 17, 199 N.W.2d 77 (1972), an insanity defense case.
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the same penal incarceration and possible opportunity for release
that other convicted defendants are accorded. 44
Individual D has a lengthy history of convictions for as-
sault, usually arising out of quarrels with drinking companions.
So inveterate a fighter and brawler is D that local law enforce-
ment authorities anticipate his frequent appearance before them.
Several months have passed since his last release from jail and
in that time he has become increasingly reclusive. At a commit-
ment proceeding initiated by the county attorney's office, D's
landlady testifies that D has refused to answer the door, replies
to questions in grunts and monosyllables, rarely goes out, and has
become so careless of hygiene and dress that passing him in the
hall is decidedly unpleasant. A psychiatrist who has examined
D testifies that he suffers from simple schizophrenia and suffers
no delusions or hallucinations. Assuming that D's past criminal
record provides a basis for a finding of dangerousness, D would
nevertheless not be a subject for police power commitment.
There is no evidence that D's schizophrenia impairs his ability to
control his behavior.45
III. CONCLUSION
If the individuals under both the insanity defense and police
power commitments belong to the same class of persons who
lack substantial capacity to control their behavior, then the
same test, employing a uniform standard to identify a common
and uniform characteristic, should be used to ascertain which
individuals fall within this class. The criminal law has slowly
and laboriously developed a standard, the insanity defense, to
identify these individuals. Civil commitment law under the
police power lacks this carefully focused, well-defined, and uni-
formly administered standard. Incorporating the insanity de-
fense standard of mental illness with its focus on capacity to
control behavior would afford this area of the law predictability
of result, fair and uniform administration, and a restraint on the
unguided discretion of the ultimate decision-maker, either judge
or jury, in imposing such a severe curtailment of liberty.
44. Example C incorporates the facts of United States v. Robinson,
439 F.2d 553 (D.C. Cir. 1970).
45. This example is derived from the discussion in PAGE, supra note
22, at 188.
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